The purpose of this database is to provide as much information as possible about American citizens and permanent residents engaged in violent extremist activity as well as individuals, regardless of their citizenship status, living within the United States who have engaged in violent extremist activity. We examine both those individuals motivated by Jihadist ideology, understood as those who worked with or were inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups, as well as those motivated by other ideologies that are non-Jihadist in character, for example right wing, left wing, or idiosyncratic beliefs. Here we provide some of the core findings including the number of extremists indicted or killed by year, the overall number of extremists indicted or killed since 2001, and the number of people killed by extremists since 2001. This data was last updated in .
* This website uses the term “charged” to describe the individuals in our dataset. While the majority of individuals in the dataset have been charged with a terrorism-related crime, we have included a small number of individuals who either died or were killed without being charged, and are widely and credibly reported as having engaged in violent extremist activity.
Homegrown Jihadist extremists present a diverse profile that resists simple categorization. The charts and statistics in this section present the demographic breakdown of extremists by ethnicity, age, gender, and citizenship.
The charts and statistics on this page seek to illustrate the legal status of the homegrown extremists in the dataset and the sentences that those who have been convicted have received. We will make an effort to keep this data up to date. However, the legal status of extremists can change rapidly as trials end and sentences are handed down.
The United States has used a number of methods to find and arrest homegrown extremists, including informants, undercover agents, tips from local communities, tips from suspicious individuals with no personal or communal connection to the extremist in question, and surveillance by the National Security Agency. The charts and statistics in this section provide information on the relative role of these investigative methods in investigations into homegrown violent extremism since 2001.
Homegrown extremists have sought to use a variety of weapons to conduct attacks within the United States. In some cases, the government has provided fake weapons to homegrown extremists they have been monitoring through an undercover agent or informant. At other times extremists have acquired weapons individually without them being provided by the government. The charts in this section show how many extremists have possessed weapons within the United States, whether they acquired them from government agents or individually, and the type of weapons they acquired.
Homegrown extremists have been engaged in a variety of forms of terrorism related activity and not all extremists have been engaged in plotting attacks within the United States. The charts in this section show the breakdown among these different activities including incidents where violence was used, activity that were prevented before it could be implemented, defection to fight abroad, and provision of funding to terrorist organizations, or production of terrorist propaganda. The charts in this section also show the number of extremists involved in plots to conduct attacks inside the United States or showing a pattern of activity that would suggest such an intent and the number who plotted to conduct attacks on military targets within the United States.
An important question regarding Jihadist homegrown extremists is how they are radicalized and to what extent homegrown extremists are connected to a global Jihadist movement through military training or the Internet. The charts in this section provide information on the number of extremists found to have had contact with Anwar Awlaki, possessed his propaganda, or cited his work. They also provide information on the number of extremists using the Internet in an operational manner or to maintain social media accounts with Jihadist content. Finally, the charts in this section show how many extremists received militant training or fought overseas.